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The Impact of Hedge Funds on Asset Markets
ABSTRACT
While there has been enormous interest in hedge funds from academics, prospective and current
investors, and policymakers, rigorous empirical evidence of their impact on asset markets has been
di¢ cult to nd. We construct a simple measure of the aggregate illiquidity of hedge fund portfolios,
and show that it has strong in- and out-of-sample forecasting power for 72 portfolios of international
equities, corporate bonds, and currencies over the 1994 to 2011 period. The forecasting ability
of hedge fund illiquidity for asset returns is in most cases greater than, and provides independent
information relative to, well-known predictive variables for each of these asset classes. We construct
a simple equilibrium model to rationalize our ndings, and empirically verify auxiliary predictions
of the model.
1. Introduction
Hedge funds have sparked enormous interest from a number of di¤erent constituencies. Wealthy
individual investors and pools of institutional capital are interested in them as a potential source
of high returns with the promise of low risk. Academics have been deeply interested in whether
these high returns are persistent and whether there are important risk exposures underlying these
returns, in addition to studying hedge fund fees, capital accumulation, and disclosure policies.
Regulators and policymakers have been wary about the industry ever since the Long-Term Capital
Management episode in 1998 nearly sparked a nancial crisis episode. The periodic collapses of
major hedge funds such as Amaranth and Mado¤ have perpetuated these concerns, because of
the perception that such collapses could impact the underlying asset markets in which these funds
are invested. These concerns are understandable: While the global hedge fund industry has only
around U.S.$ 1.5 trillion of assets under management (AUM), hedge funds substantial leverage
and the high levels of trading volume that they generate in underlying asset markets means that
their impact may well be disproportionately large.
Despite this high level of interest and concern, there has been a paucity of compelling empirical
evidence that connects the activity of hedge funds to returns in underlying asset markets. Our paper
attempts to ll this gap, by providing evidence that hedge funds have an important, measurable,
impact on expected returns. We do so by constructing a simple measure of their aggregate ability
to provide liquidity to asset markets, and show that this measure has strong predictive power for
a wide range of assets spanning three broad categories, namely, international equities, corporate
bonds, and currencies.
Hedge funds are often characterized as arbitrageurs in nancial markets. Canonically, this
term refers to the generation of a riskless return by the simultaneous trade of under- and over-
valued securities. However the term is often abused when applied to hedge funds, and generally
describes the exploitation of protable, albeit risky investment opportunities, with an emphasis on
managing risk to the greatest possible extent. One particularly important source of such investment
opportunities for hedge funds has been the provision of liquidity to asset markets (see, for example,
Aragon (2007), Sadka (2011), and Jylha, Rinne, and Suominen (2013) among others). As a result
of exploiting these opportunities, hedge funds are exposed to illiquidity risk, and impose investment
restrictions on their outside investors to safeguard against the withdrawal of hedge fund capital
over short horizons when illiquidity-driven price pressure is likely most acute. The extent of their
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exposure can be measured: Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) cleverly identify that hedge funds
holding the most illiquid investments are likely to exhibit persistent returns, and propose that the
extent of illiquidity for any given fund at a point in time can be ascertained by the autocorrelation
of its returns.
We take this insight as the starting point for our analysis. We measure the extent of return
autocorrelation for each fund in our comprehensive universe of roughly 30,000 hedge funds, in each
month over the period from 1994 to 2011. We then aggregate this measure by simply averaging the
fund-specic rst-order autocorrelation estimates each month. We nd that the resulting measure
of the aggregate illiquidity of hedge funds, which we dub ;has strong and consistent predictive
power for 72 portfolios of assets spanning three major asset classes. In-sample, our measure is
signicant for 21 out of 21 international equity indexes, 31 out of 42 US corporate bond portfolios
spanning the ratings and maturity spectrum, and 6 out of 9 developed-world currencies that we
consider. This is strong, and broad, support for the importance of our new measure.
This predictive power of  is not just in-sample; we also nd evidence that the measure has
appreciable out-of-sample forecasting power. Out-of-sample, our predictor beats the historical
mean return model, and a range of competitors for 20 out of 21 international equities portfolios,
28 out of 42 US corporate bond portfolios, and 3 out of 9 currencies. In both in-sample and out-of-
sample predictive regressions, our proposed measure generally outperforms, and always contributes
incremental explanatory power relative to, a range of competitor variables which are known from
the relevant asset class-specic literatures to be useful forecasters of asset returns.
To rationalize our ndings, we build a simple equilibrium model, which incorporates liquidity
constraints into the limits to arbitrage framework of Gromb and Vayanos (2010). In our model, the
hedge fund begins with an endowment of illiquid assets and cash, and makes returns by providing
liquidity to absorb buying and selling pressure from noise traders. The hedge fund thus acts as a
quasi-market-maker for the risky asset. However, the liquidity provision capacity of the hedge fund
is limited by the threat of its outside investors withdrawing their funds, which forces it to hold
a su¢ cient quantity of cash to satisfy these redemptions, meaning that an illiquid hedge fund is
(relatively) reluctant to purchase the risky asset, and (relatively) eager to sell it. We evaluate the
comparative statics in the model as we vary the starting endowment of illiquid assets held by the
hedge fund, and nd that this impacts expected returns the higher the measure of illiquidity of
the hedge funds portfolio, the higher are expected asset returns.
The model yields additional predictions about both the time-series and the cross-sectional re-
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lationship between hedge fund illiquidity and the expected impacts on asset markets, which we
verify in empirical tests. For example, the model predicts, in line with intuition, that the higher
the starting level of illiquidity of the underlying assets, the greater the impact on the asset of hedge
fund illiquidity, and thus the greater the level of return predictability from . Consistent with this
prediction, we nd the highest levels of predictability in relatively small equity markets, high-yield
corporate bonds, and high interest rate currencies.
The literature on hedge funds is fast-growing many authors, such as Agarwal and Naik (2004),
Fung and Hsieh (1997, 2001, 2004), Bollen and Whaley (2009), Mamaysky, Spiegel, and Zhang
(2007), and Patton and Ramadorai (2012) have documented that hedge funds are signicantly
exposed to systematic risk, proxied by indexes of equity, bond, and options returns. Rigorous
empirical evidence on the reverse direction, namely the impact of hedge funds on asset markets,
has been less well-documented. Kang, Kondor, and Sadka (2012) provide evidence suggesting that
hedge funds a¤ect idiosyncratic risk in equity markets, and Cao, Chen, Liang, and Lo (2012) suggest
that hedge funds help in the security price formation process, pushing equity returns to be more
in line with the e¢ cient frontier. Our paper provides wide-ranging evidence about hedge funds
impact on a variety of asset markets using a relatively simply constructed variable, which we view
as a useful contribution to this emerging literature.
Our paper also adds to the literature on the impacts of liquidity and liquidity risk on asset
markets by contributing an important new variable, aggregate hedge fund illiquidity. We view our
newly introduced variable as a complement to a number of asset-class-specic liquidity measures
(see for example, Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Khandani and Lo
(2011), and Bongaerts, de Jong, and Driessen (2012)) that have been utilized extensively in the
literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the construction of
our hedge fund illiquidity index as well as the asset return data employed in our study. Section
3 presents the in-sample and out-of-sample forecasting results using the illiquidity index. Section
4 presents our model, and empirically tests additional model predictions. Section 5 considers the
robustness of our results to a number of di¤erent variations, and the nal section concludes.
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2. Data description
2.1. Asset return data
Our empirical analysis covers three major asset classes: international equities, corporate bonds,
and currencies. Within each asset class, we study a broad range of individual assets. As our hedge
fund data is only available monthly, and our total time series length is under 20 years, we focus
on monthly asset return predictability rather than higher- or lower-frequency returns. For each
of the asset classes, we compare the predictive performance of our hedge fund illiquidity measure
with that of a range of benchmarks from the extant literature. We describe this set of competing
predictor variables utilized for each asset class below.
We employ 21 national international equity index returns in our analysis, namely, Austria,
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and US.
We source our data on returns from Kenneth Frenchs website. We compute log excess returns on
each of these indices over the sample period 1995 to 2011. As competitor predictor variables,
we employ the dividend yield for each equity index from Kenneth Frenchs website, as well as
innovations in the VIX index, computed using an AR(2) model.1
Our dataset on U.S. corporate bonds comprises 42 indices from Bank of AmericaMerrill Lynch,
of which 24 are investment-grade portfolios and 18 are high-yield portfolios, with maturities ranging
from one year to over fteen years. Our corporate bond data begin in 1997 and ends in 2011.
Following Bongaerts, de Jong, and Driessen (2012) we compare the return prediction performance of
our hedge fund illiquidity measure with that of the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor acquired from
CRSP, innovations to the VIX estimated as described above, and market-capitalization weighted
excess returns on the S&P 500 index, also from CRSP.
Our data on currencies comprises nine currency rates against the US dollar, namely Australian
Dollar, Canadian Dollar, Euro, Japanese Yen, New Zealand Dollar, Norwegian Krone, Swedish
Krona, Swiss Franc, and British Pound. The data are sourced from Bloomberg and cover the
period 1995 to 2011 (we use the Deutsche Mark prior to the introduction of the Euro). Our
monthly log currency returns are measured as US dollar per unit of foreign currency.2 Given the
1Goyal and Welch (2008) consider a wider array of predictor variables than those here, however our focus on
international equity returns, rather than just U.S. returns, means that the number of available competitors is restricted
by data limitations.
2We also considered excess currency returns (over the interest rate di¤erential), and found that the results were
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ndings of Meese and Rogo¤ (1983), we expect that these returns will be extremely di¢ cult to
predict. The competitor variables for predicting currency returns include the ination di¤erential
from the OECD database and the one month Libor interest rate di¤erential from Bloomberg.
Summary statistics for all three asset classes can be found in Table 1. Given the large number
of individual bond return series (42 in total), when reporting summary statistics we group them
into Investment Gradeand High Yieldbonds, as well as separating them by maturity.
[Insert Table 1 here]
2.2. An index of hedge fund illiquidity
To compute our hedge fund illiquidity index, we employ monthly hedge fund returns over the
period from January 1994 to December 2011, consolidated from data in the TASS, HFR, CISDM,
Morningstar, and BarclayHedge databases. These data represent the most comprehensive set of
hedge fund data available from public sources, and comprise a total of 29,496 individual hedge
funds, including all births and deaths of funds over the period. (Details of the process followed
to consolidate these data can be found in Patton, Ramadorai, and Streateld (2013).) Reported
returns are net of management and incentive fees.
Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) and Lo (2007) propose using autocorrelation in a hedge
funds returns as a proxy for the illiquidity of its asset holdings. Their rationale is that hedge fund
managers mark their portfolios to market at the end of each month, and may be forced to use models
to estimate portfolio values owing to the illiquidity of the assets in the portfolio. One such simple
model is linear extrapolation of returns in the portfolio, which would lead to reported hedge returns
exhibiting positive autocorrelation. Another factor generating spurious positive autocorrelation is
holding both liquid and illiquid assets in a portfolio, generating non-synchroneity of returns (see,
for example, Scholes and Williams (1977) and Dimson (1979)). Thus autocorrelation in hedge fund
returns provides a (noisy) measure of the degree of illiquidity of the hedge funds holdings higher
levels of autocorrelation are associated with higher levels of illiquidity.
Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) also consider the case that hedge fund managers engage in
performance smoothing,whereby reported returns are a smoothed version of the true returns (see
Bollen and Pool (2008, 2009) and Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2011) for related work). Intentional
smoothing leads to the same features as the smoothing that arises from marking to model:
very similar.
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reported returns have positive autocorrelation even when the underlying true returns do not. If
some managers engage in smoothing regardless of market conditions, then this will work against
us nding a signicant result: the relationship between hedge fund portfolio illiquidity and asset
returns will be muddied by individual fund illiquidity estimates that are unrelated to true illiquidity.
If, however, these managers engage in opportunistic smoothing, i.e., they make choices when
marking to model that smooth their returns in a favorable way, then the degree of intentional
smoothing will be correlated with underlying asset liquidity, which will maintain the direction of
the relationship between hedge fund illiquidity and asset returns.
Our aggregate measure of hedge fund portfolio illiquidity (which we denote by t in month t) is
computed using the following simple procedure. First, we compute the rst-order autocorrelation
of each hedge funds returns using a rolling 12-month window. Having computed these return
autocorrelations for all individual funds for which we have the prior 12 months of returns available
in each month, we impose a lower bound of zero on any autocorrelation estimate which is estimated
to be negative.3 We then simply average these autocorrelations across all funds for each month in
our sample t, yielding t. In our main analysis we use an equal-weighted average of these individual
illiquidity estimates, and in our robustness checks we show that using an AUM-weighted measure
leads to similar results.
Given the 12-month burn-inperiod for estimating rolling autocorrelations, our time series of
the hedge fund illiquidity measure begins in December 1994 and ends in December 2011. Figure 1
plots the AUM weighted and the equally weighted hedge fund illiquidity measures over time, and
shows that hedge fund illiquidity spikes during the LTCM crisis of 1998 and the Quant meltdown
of August 2007 (see Khandani and Lo (2011)), as well as during the Great Recession. However, the
recession following the NASDAQ crash at the turn of the millennium did not appear to a¤ect the
measure greatly. It is also evident from the plot that the equal-weighted illiquidity measure has
far greater volatility than the value-weighted measure, which suggests that larger funds manage
their liquidity more e¤ectively. This may not be surprising given that funding liquidity pressure
imposed by prime-brokerage relationships and capital inows to funds may be less of an issue for
larger, better-established hedge funds.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
3We impose the lter simply because the interpretation of positive autocorrelation estimates is conceptually far
easier. In our robustness checks, we dont impose this lter, and nd that our results actually strengthen. Estimation
error can drive positive autocorrelation estimates below zero when the true values are above zero.
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Summary statistics for the measure are reported in Table 2. The funds in the combined data-
base come from a broad range of vendor-classied strategies, which we consolidate into nine main
strategy groups: Security Selection, Macro, Relative Value, Directional Traders, Funds-of-Funds,
Multi-Process, Emerging Markets, Fixed Income, and Managed Futures (see Patton, Ramadorai,
and Streateld (2013) for detailed mappings between self-reported classications and these broad
categories).
The table reports summary statistics for hedge fund illiquidity indices computed for each in-
dividual style, followed by those computed across all funds, regardless of style. The table reveals
cross-sectional variation in illiquidity that is consistent with intuition. For example, the Fixed
Income style has a high mean level of illiquidity, while the Managed Futures funds are the least
illiquid. In our analysis, we focus on the illiquidity index based on all funds, rather than that de-
rived from a specic style. This is partly motivated by a desire for simplicity, and partly by a desire
for robustness to potential style drift and misclassication arising from the static and self-reported
style classications in our hedge fund databases. The supplemental appendix contains an analysis
of how these features can lead to an index based on all funds can deliver better results than one
which relies upon noisy style classications. In Section 5, we show results obtained when employing
illiquidity indices based on hedge funds in styles that are, in theory, more closely related to a given
asset class, and nd that they are similar.
[ Insert Table 2 here]
3. Empirical results on asset returns and hedge fund illiquidity
We now present our main analysis of the predictive power of the hedge fund illiquidity measures
for future asset returns. We study this relationship using a variety of simple models. Our rst
set of results are based on full-sample estimation of the relationship, and we conclude with an
out-of-sample forecasting analysis.
3.1. Does hedge fund illiquidity predict asset returns?
Our rst analysis of the relationship between hedge fund illiquidity and asset returns is based on
a simple predictive regression, in which we use the hedge fund illiquidity measure described above,
denoted t, to predict one-month-ahead returns ri;t+1 on asset i. (Newey-West (1987) standard
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errors are employed in all time-series regressions):
ri;t+1 = i + it + i;t+1: (3.1)
For comparison, we also estimate the same univariate model using various competitor variables,
suggested by the asset-class-specic literatures, in place of t. We also include hedge fund ows as
a competitor, as they a¤ect the liquidity of a hedge funds portfolio, and Jylha et al. (2013) nd
that increases in hedge fund ows reduce the amount of short-term return reversal and volatility in
the U.S. equity market. Moreover, our model (below) discusses the di¤erent roles of ows and the
starting endowment of a funds illiquid assets, making ows a natural competitor for . We compute
these ows fund-by-fund using the standard approach (see, for example, Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and
Ramadorai (2008)), winsorize them at the 1% and 99% percentile points, and AUM-weight them
to construct an aggregate ow index.
The results of estimating this model on the international equity index returns are presented in
Panel A of Table 3. This panel shows that the coe¢ cient on our hedge fund illiquidity index is
positive and signicant at the 5% level for all 21 countries, generating an adjusted R2 of between
1.3% (Finland) and 8.2% (Australia), with an average of 3.4%. Of the three competing predictor
variables, the innovations to the VIX index are the next most important, with 8 out of 21 index
returns having a coe¢ cient on VIX that is signicant at the 5% level, and another 3 signicant at
the 10% level. The average R2 from models using the VIX is 2.7%. Models based on the dividend
yield, lagged returns, and hedge fund ows perform relatively poorly this last suggests that the
total endowment of hedge fund illiquid assets, and not just the per-period capital ows, are what
matter for identifying the predictive relationship.
Next, we estimate a multivariate regression model where we include all of the competitor
predictor variables together with the hedge fund illiquidity measure in the same in-sample predictive
regression:
ri;t+1 = i + iXt + it + i;t+1; (3.2)
where Xt is a vector that contains all of the competitor variables. The last two columns of Panel
A present the results from this model with and without the hedge fund illiquidity index included,
to reveal the additional explanatory power of including our measure of hedge fund illiquidity. We
see that the average adjusted R2 jumps from 3.2% to 7.1% with the inclusion of our measure.
Furthermore, our measure remains positive and signicant at the 5% level for all 21 country indices
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even after the inclusion of the competitor variables. This provides strong support that there is
substantial incremental predictive power in hedge fund illiquidity for international equity returns.
[Insert Table 3 here]
The next panel of the table conducts the same in-sample predictive analysis using returns data
on U.S. corporate bonds. Given the large number of individual bonds (42) in our sample, we report
just summaries of those results, aggregating rst by ratings class (investment grade or high yield)
and then by maturity.4 The results are presented in the second panel of Table 3. For investment
grade bonds, the hedge fund illiquidity index is the most successful single predictor across the
set of ve predictor variables, generating an average adjusted R2 of 3.1%, and having a signicant
coe¢ cient for 14 out of the 24 individual bonds. The next most successful is the simple lagged return
on corporate bonds, which generates an R2 of 1.8% and is signicant for 12 out of 24 bonds. For
high yield bonds many of the individual variables are signicant: our hedge fund illiquidity index
has the second-highest R2 (6.4%, compared with 8.0% from lagged returns) and the second-highest
number of signicant coe¢ cients (17 out of 18, compared with 18 for the lagged value-weighted
equity return).
Turning to the results from the multiple regression model, we see that the hedge fund illiquidity
index adds substantial predictive power beyond the four competitor variables: the adjusted R2 rises
from 4.3% to 6.6% for investment grade bonds, and from 14.6% to 19.6% for high yield bonds. The
number of bonds with signicant coe¢ cients on the hedge fund illiquidity index is 14 (out of 24)
for investment grade bonds and 18 out of 18 for high yield bonds. Thus the hedge fund illiquidity
index is a signicant predictor of corporate bond returns, and appears particularly useful for high
yield bonds.
The lower part of Panel B of Table 3 presents results across bond maturity. We nd that the
results are robust across both the short and long ends of the yield curve, with a slight increase in
predictive ability as measured by R2 for the longest maturity instruments. We explore the cross-
sectional variation in predictive ability along both the maturity and the ratings dimensions further
as part of our empirical tests of the predictions of the equilibrium model presented in the next
section.
Panel C of Table 3 presents the results of in-sample regressions for currency returns. As is
well known (see, for example Meese and Rogo¤ (1983) and a large literature thereafter), currencies
4Results for the individual bonds can be found in the online appendix.
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are generally very hard to predict, and this is conrmed by our analysis. However, our hedge fund
illiquidity index performs well: in univariate regressions it generates an average adjusted R2 of 2.1%
(slightly lower than that for the ination di¤erential, with 2.9%), and is statistically signicant for
six out of the nine currencies under consideration. In the multiple regression results we see that
the R2 increases from 3.1% to 4.1% with the inclusion of the hedge fund illiquidity index, and the
variable is signicant for ve out of the nine currencies. Thus even for the notoriously challenging
task of predicting currency returns, our hedge fund illiquidity index adds value.
Figure 2 shows the length of time over which the hedge fund illiquidity index retains predictive
ability for future equity, bond, and currency returns. The top panel of the gure shows the results for
the single-variable predictive regressions, and the bottom panel for the multiple-variable predictive
regressions. The line in each gure shows the average adjusted R2, while the bars show the number
of assets for which the hedge fund illiquidity index is statistically signicant. Along the horizontal
axis, we vary the forecast horizon: h = 1 corresponds to our baseline regression where we forecast
returns using the one-month lagged illiquidity index, and h = 6 corresponds to forecasting returns
using six-month lagged hedge fund illiquidity. The gure shows that the forecasting power of the
hedge fund illiquidity index is quite long-lasting: the forecasting performance for all three asset
classes only deteriorates signicantly at the 7 to 8 month horizons.5 Given our motivation for
considering this variable, namely, the illiquidity of hedge fund portfolios as a signal of their ability
to provide liquidity to markets, this long-lasting forecasting power is not particularly surprising 
it could easily take up to six months for an illiquid hedge fund to unwind its portfolio and return
to the role of liquidity provision to asset markets. We motivate this insight more rigorously in our
discussion of our model in Section 4.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
3.2. The out-of-sample predictive power of hedge fund illiquidity
The above analyses used the full sample of data to estimate the relationship between hedge fund
illiquidity and asset returns. In this section we consider the out-of-sample (OOS) performance of
models based on hedge fund illiquidity, as well as competitor predictor variables. Out-of-sample
5We note here that the hedge fund illiquidity index is persistent, with rst-order autocorrelation of 0.84, and a
95% condence interval of [0.72,0.96]. However, an augmented Dickey-Fuller test for a unit root very strongly rejects
the null in favor of stationarity, and the point estimate suggests that the persistence should not cause us any real
problems with inference in forecasting. Thus this persistence in predictive power is not attributable to excessive
persistence in our illiquidity index.
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evaluation is increasingly an important metric for predictive models of asset returns, on account
of its greater relevance for real-world investors (see for example, Goyal and Welch (2008), and
Campbell and Thompson (2008) for analyses of the predictive ability of various models for the
equity premium). In this sub-section, we take the perspective of a real-world investor engaging in
forecasting the set of asset returns introduced earlier, using our index of hedge fund illiquidity.
Given the well-known di¢ culty of out-of-sample asset return prediction, we focus on simple
single-variable predictive models, as in equation (3.1). We estimate the parameters of the models
using a rolling window of 60 months of data, so our in-sample period is January 1995 to December
1999, and our out-of-sample period is January 2000 to December 2011. We report the OOS R2 from
each of the models, and we extend the Clark and West (2006) test to enable formal comparison of
the above model with a model that only includes a constant. (The original Clark-West test requires
the smaller model to contain no parameters at all, whereas for asset returns it is more reasonable
to take as a benchmark a model with just a constant term.) The details of this simple extension
are presented in the Appendix, and a small simulation study in the supplemental appendix that
veries its nite sample performance.
Panel A of Table 4 presents the OOS results for predicting international equity index returns.
Forecasts based on our hedge fund illiquidity index generate an average OOS R2 of 3.2%, ranging
from -0.9% for Japan to 9.0% for Australia. In only a single case (Japan) is the OOS R2 negative,
and for 20 out of the 21 countries the (extension of the) Clark-West test rejects the constant model
in favor of a model based on the hedge fund illiquidity index.6 In contrast, the OOS forecasts based
on the three competing variables (dividend yield, lagged returns and shocks to the VIX index)
generate negative average OOS R2, and are signicant for a maximum of four countries in the
sample. These results thus provide support for the result obtained in our full-sample analysis that
hedge fund illiquidity is useful for predicting international equity index returns.
In Panel B of Table 4 we nd similarly good results for U.S. corporate bonds. The average OOS
R2 from forecasts based on our hedge fund illiquidity index is 4.4%, and is positive for all ratings
and maturity subsets of these bonds. Further, we formally reject the constant model in favor of
our model for 28 out of the 42 bonds. The forecasts based on the competing variables (lagged
returns, shocks to the VIX index, and the lagged market return) perform much worse: all three
6Note that a higher OOS R2 does not necessarily translate to greater signicance in the Clark-West test. For
example, the forecasts based on the hedge fund liquidity index have an R2 of 3.7% for the Netherlands, but do not
reject the null that the constant model is best, while for Italy the R2 is 2.3% and we do reject the null in favor of
the larger model.
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generate negative average R2: The forecasts based on the lagged market return perform the best of
these three variables, with an average OOS R2 of -2.8%, and signicantly beating the benchmark
constant model for 17 out of 42 bonds. For the lagged market return, the only subset of bonds for
which the average OOS R2 is positive is the high yield group, and even there the performance of
this predictor variable is inferior to that obtained when using our index of hedge fund illiquidity.
Panel C of Table 4 presents results for OOS currency return prediction. As might be expected
given the well-documented di¢ culty of predicting currency returns, the OOS R2 is lower for this
asset class, and indeed for all four variables we nd a negative average OOS R2, with the highest
(-0.03%) coming from our hedge fund illiquidity index. For three of these currencies we are able to
reject the constant model in favor of a model based on the hedge fund illiquidity index: Australia,
Canada and New Zealand; the forecasts for Norway have a positive OOS R2, but we do not reject
the null. It is noteworthy that these are all relatively high interest-rate commodity currencies
 which are generally associated with the long side of the frequently studied carry trade (see
Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011) for an overview of the carry trade literature). This
nding is explored further when we test our model predictions below. Finally, when we compare the
performance of the illiquidity index to forecasts of currency returns based on competing variables,
the primary signicant result is the usefulness of the ination di¤erential for predicting the euro
return: this forecast generated an OOS R2 of 4.8% and is signicantly better than the constant
model. The interest rate di¤erential rejects the constant model for New Zealand and Sweden. The
lagged returns fail to generate a positive R2 or reject the constant model for all currencies.
[Insert Table 4 here]
It is worth noting here that our out-of-sample period, 2000 to 2011, spans the nancial crisis
and the great recession.Unfortunately, hedge fund data only became available in the early to mid
1990s, and so we are unable to conduct formal analysis of the impact of recessions on the predictive
relationships we document here. To gain some insight into the impact, we constructed a time series
of the cumulative sum of squared errors of the historical mean return model and the predictive
regression, similar to that used in Goyal and Welch (2008). For all three asset classes we nd that
our hedge fund illiquidity index performs particularly well during the nancial crisis. We view
this as consistent with our explanation for the source of the predictive power: during this period,
capital constraints on hedge fund portfolios ("funding liquidity" a la Gromb and Vayanos (2002)
and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008)) were likely most binding, translating into constraints on
12
hedge fundsliquidity provision to asset markets.
The next section presents a simple model which provides a more rigorous foundation for this
and our other results, and generates additional empirical predictions which we subsequently test.
4. A model of hedge fund illiquidity and asset return determination
Our model is based on the limits of arbitrage framework laid out in Gromb and Vayanos (2010). In
our simple model, there is one risky asset, which is traded by a risk-averse hedge fund and by noise
traders. The hedge fund e¤ectively acts as the market maker for the risky asset, which is subject
to demand shocks originated by the noise traders.
4.1. The timeline of the model
The model contains three periods, with a timeline as follows. In period 0, the hedge fund in our
model inherits an illiquid endowment , which we assume it cannot sell, and a cash endowment C0:
For simplicity, the return on both the illiquid endowment and the cash endowment are set to zero.
In period 1, the hedge fund determines its demand for the risky asset as a function of price. The net
demand of the noise traders is then realized and trading occurs, which determines the equilibrium
price and quantity traded for the risky asset. In period 2 the dividend on the risky asset is realized
and paid.
In the next section we describe the hedge funds optimization problem, and then we nd an
expression for the equilibrium price and quantity of risky asset traded.
4.2. The hedge funds objective function
The objective function of the hedge fund is assumed to take a simple quadratic form, and the fund
is subject to one additional, important constraint. In our model, the hedge fund is concerned about
the illiquidity of its portfolio, because it potentially faces outows from its investors. As a result,
it requires a su¢ cient quantity of liquid assets in each period to pay out investors who withdraw
their funds.
We model the illiquidity constraint in a straightforward fashion. The hedge fund has an ex-
pectation of the maximum level of fund outows in a given time period, denoted max, which we
assume to be increasing in both C0 and : (Below we specialize to the case that it is proportional
to C0 + :) We model a convex shortfall penaltyif the fund does not hold su¢ cient liquid assets
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to cover max once it trades in the risky asset. Letting x1 denote the demand of the hedge fund
for the risky asset, and p1 the equilbrium price of the risky asset in period 1, the convex shortfall
penalty is given by:
0 if max < C1
1
2(max   C1)2 if max  C1
(4.1)
where C1 = C0   x1p1 is the new level of liquid assets that the fund holds after its purchases or
sales of the risky asset.
The funds objective function can therefore be written as:
Q (x1) = x1(E[d2]  p1)  
2
x21
2   1
2
(max   C0 + x1p1)21 fmax  C0   x1p1g (4.2)
Here, d2 is the dividend, which has variance 2,  is the risk aversion of the fund, and  is the
weight on the illiquidity constraint in the funds objective function.
The rst order condition of the hedge funds maximization problem is:
(E[d2]  p1)  x12   (max   C1)p11 fmax  C0   x1p1g = 0; (4.3)
This results in the period 1 demand function:
x1 =
(E[d2]  p1)  (max   C0)p11 fmax  C0   x1p1g
2 + p211 fmax  C0   x1p1g
: (4.4)
The demand function reveals that the lower the value of C0, and the higher the illiquid endow-
ment  (which raises max) the lower is the quantity of the risky asset x1 which the hedge fund
will hold. This yields an important prediction: an illiquid hedge fund is more willing to sell the
risky asset than to buy it. This feature of the model, which we explain more fully below, is what
underpins the models explanation for the predictive power of our hedge fund illiquidity index for
asset returns.
4.3. Market clearing and the equilibrium price
The demand of the noise traders u1 is an exogenous shock, and determines the price that the hedge
fund demands to absorb this shock in equilibrium. To compute the equilibrium price we need to
clear markets. As in Gromb and Vayanos (2010), we interpret the demand shock u1 as net aggregate
demand, which implies that the risky asset is in zero net supply. The market clearing condition
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therefore takes the form:
(E[d2]  p1)  (max   C0)p11 fmax  C0   x1p1g
2 + p211 fmax  C0   x1p1g
+ u1 = 0: (4.5)
For the case where max > C0   x1p1, solving for p1 results in the following equilibrium price:7
p1 =
(1 + (max   C0)) 
p
(1 + (max   C0))2   4(u1)(E[d2] + 2u1)
2u1
: (4.6)
4.4. Model-implied hedge fund illiquidity and asset returns
We measure the model-implied illiquidity level of the hedge funds portfolio at time 1 as the ratio
of the value of its holdings of illiquid assets to the value of its total assets under management:
model1 =
 + x1p1
( + x1p1) + (C0   x1p1) :
Hence the lower C0 relative to , the greater the illiquidity of the hedge funds portfolio. The
implicit assumption here is that the illiquid endowment and the risky asset contribute equally to
illiquidity. (This can of course be relaxed, and we look at comparative statics along this dimension
when testing model-implied predictions.)
We next specify parameters and simulate the model to better understand its predictions. For
this analysis, we set max = max(+C0). For example, when max = 0:5, the hedge fund expects
that in the worst case scenario its investors will withdraw 50% of the AUM in the next period.
Panel A of Table 5 shows the specic parameter values that we use. The two sources of uncertainty
in our model, d2 and u1, are drawn from normal distributions with means E[d2] = 1 and E[u1] = 0,
and variances 2d = 0:01 and 
2
u = 0:5 respectively. , the weight on the shortfall penalty in the
hedge funds objective function, is set to 0:01, , the risk-aversion of the hedge fund to 3, and ,
the starting endowment of the illiquid asset to 10.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Panel B of Table 5 looks at comparative statics as we vary C0, which determines the level of
illiquidity of the fund. In this exercise, values for d2 and u1 are drawn from their distributions whose
7The quadratic equation for the equilibrium price has a second root. However, we ignore the second root, as the
implied equilibrium price is not sensible regardless of the parameter values. When the hedge fund buys, the price is
negative and generally smaller than -100. When the hedge fund sells, the price is positive and generally greater than
100.
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parameters are given in Panel A, while the value of C0 is varied across di¤erent simulations. We
simulate the two period model 10; 000 times for each value of C0 and compute the average expected
return, model1 , and the price discountsrelative to expected fundamental value E[d2] = 1 at which
noise traders buy from and sell to the hedge fund in each case.8
The top row in this panel simply sets the liquidity constraint on the fund to zero, i.e.,  = 0, as
a benchmark, so the values of C0 and max are not relevant. The expected return is computed as
the average realization of 1p1 . The noise traders buy from the hedge fund at a price slightly above
expected fundamental value, and sell to the hedge fund at a slightly lower price than expected
fundamental value as compensation for the hedge funds market-making services.
As we move down the rows of Panel B of the table, we impose the liquidity constraint, and
vary the level of starting cash C0, resulting in a cash-to-liquid assets ratio of 50%, 40%, and 30%
respectively for each of the bottom three rows. max = max( + C0) varies as we vary the level
of cash, but always maintains the maximum 50% of AUM withdrawal expectation. The model1
values that these correspond to are shown in the next column, and we can see that a decrease in
C0 leads to a higher average model1 , as well as in the next column, to a higher average expected
return. This expected return is higher than the return in the benchmark case, which reects the
extra compensation needed to convince the illiquid hedge fund to purchase more of the risky asset,
as well as the price discount o¤ered by the hedge fund to the noise traders when they purchase
the risky asset. While the illiquid hedge fund is willing to sell the risky asset for a lower price in
the face of a positive noise trader demand shock, in order to increase the liquidity of its portfolio
and avoid hitting the shortfall penalty, the fund is reluctant to buy the risky asset, and requires
more compensation to do so. Relative to expected fundamental value, the price discount to the
noise traders is substantial given our parameter values reaching roughly 3% when the hedge fund
discounts the price to sell to noise traders, and roughly  3:75% when the hedge fund demands
compensation in order to accept more of the risky asset into its portfolio, when C0 = 3.
Finally, we again simulate the model 10; 000 times, with C0 drawn from a normal distribution
with a mean of 4 and a standard deviation of 0:5, and d2 and u1 drawn as described above. We
then take the 10; 000 observations of model1 derived from each one of these simulations and the
realized returns in the second period r2, derived from these simulations, and regress:
rrealized2 = 0 + 1
model
1 + 2: (4.7)
8 In all of the 10,000 simulations, the shortfall penalty is positive.
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The model-implied 0 and 1 are reported in the rst column of Panel C of Table 5. We also
separately estimate 0 and 1 conditional on the sign of realized u1, corresponding to realizations
in which noise traders buy and noise traders sell. This reveals that the coe¢ cient  is positive
regardless of the sign of the shock, which is consistent with the intuition of the model, and a feature
that we conrm in our auxiliary empirical tests below.
Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the model predictions  the gure shows the
comparative static of the price path compared across levels of illiquidity model1 of the hedge fund.
Compared to a liquid hedge fund, an illiquid hedge fund buys for a lower price when noise traders
sell, which implies a greater return reversal. It also sells for a lower price when noise traders buy
the risky asset, implying a smaller return reversal. When these predictions are taken together, the
model implies that high model1 predicts high returns. Figure 4 shows what would happen if there
is exogenous variation in the illiquidity of the underlying asset for reasons unrelated to our model.
As might be expected, for a more illiquid asset, there would be an amplication of the e¤ects seen
in our model. The next subsection tests some of the additional predictions implied by our model.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
[Insert Figure 4 here]
4.5. Empirical predictions of the model
This section presents tests of predictions from the model described above, using real worlddata.
Above, we showed that regardless of the sign of the noise trader shock, the model predicts that
the coe¢ cient on  will be positive. To test this, we use an approach from Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003), who identify positive and negative noise trader demand shocks using the sign of the lagged
return. We thus estimate a specication which includes the lagged return, as well as a dummy for
the sign of the lagged return that we interact with our hedge fund illiquidity index:
ri;t+1 = i + ri;t + 
NoiseSelltIfri;t<0g + 
NoiseBuyIfri;t>0g + i;t+1: (4.8)
The prediction of our theoretical model is that both NoiseSell and NoiseBuy will be positive. When
estimating the above specication, to increase the precision of the parameter estimates, we estimate
it as a panel, grouping all assets i within each of the three broad asset classes. We allow for an asset-
specic xed e¤ect in estimation, and we impose that the slope coe¢ cients are the same across all
assets within each class. In all panel regressions, standard errors are adjusted for contemporaneous
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correlation using a delete-cross-section jackknife method (see Shao and Wu (1989) and Shao (1989)
for examples of the implementation of the jackknife estimator).
Equation (4.8) nests our specication from Section 3.1, as when NoiseSell = NoiseBuy the indi-
cator variable e¤ectively drops out. We consider the full model, and also restricted versions where
we include just one or the other of the interaction terms, and Table 6 presents the results from
this model for the three asset classes. In all three asset classes, corresponding to the three panels
in the table, we see that the coe¢ cients NoiseSell and NoiseBuy are estimated to be positive, and
statistically signicant (with the one exception of currencies, for which NoiseBuy is positive, but
not statistically signicant.
[Insert Table 6 here]
A second prediction from the model is that more illiquid assets will have higher predictability.
To test this prediction, for each asset class we run another xed-e¤ect panel regression, in which we
include ,  interacted with a dummy which captures assets with greater illiquidity, and the set of
all competitorpredictor variables X for the asset returns in a given class. As before, the model
is estimated for each asset class. The specication is:
ri;t+1 = i + t + 
Illiq.tIi + Xt + i;t+1; (4.9)
The liquidity dummy Ii takes the value one if portfolio i is more illiquid, and we set this equal to
one for high yield corporate bonds, longer maturity (over 5 years) corporate bonds, international
equity markets with average market capitalization lower than the median, and currencies with Libor
interest rates higher than the median.9 We expect the coe¢ cient of the illiquidity dummy to be
signicant and positive, and Table 7 shows that this is indeed the case, consistently for all asset
classes.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Overall, the simple model presented in this section helps explain our main predictive results in
Section 3, and generates additional testable predictions that are conrmed in our data.
9We expect that these popular long carry trade currencies will be the rst to be avoided in the event of a ight
to liquidityor to a safe havenresulting in their liquidity being lower. See, for example, Campbell, et al. (2010).
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5. Robustness checks
This section presents a variety of robustness checks of our main analyses. The top row of Table
8 (labelled Base case) corresponds to the bottom-right elements of Panels A, B and C of Table
3. The gures reported are the average adjusted R2 from the mutiple predictor regression, and
the number of coe¢ cients (across the individual assets in a given asset class) that are signicantly
positive and signicantly negative.
[Insert Table 8 here]
First, we consider varying the length of the window over which we compute return autocor-
relations, which form the basis of our hedge fund illiquidity index. Our baseline analysis uses 12
months, and this table considers the use of 9 months, 18 months and 24 months. The trade-o¤ here
is estimation error (longer windows have less estimation error) against timeliness (shorter windows
are less stale). For international equities and currencies we see that a 12-month window strikes
the optimum balance between these competing goals, outperforming the other choices, particularly
the shorter, 9-month, window. The results for corporate bonds, on the other hand, are reasonably
insensitive to the choice of window length.
We next consider alternative models for obtaining an estimate of the degree of autocorrelation
in hedge fund returns. Our baseline model uses simple rst-order autocorrelation, which can be
interpreted as the autoregressive parameter in an AR(1) model. We consider variations based on an
AR(2), an MA(1) and an MA(2), all estimated using a rolling 12-month window. For the second-
order models there are two parameters that capture autocorrelation, and to summarize these into
a single number we use the R2 from the model. For the MA(1) model we simply use the estimated
MA parameter. Table 8 shows that the second-order models tend to do worse than the rst-order
models, likely due to the increased estimation error from the additional parameter. The MA(1)
model actually performs slightly better than our baseline AR(1) model, though the gains are small.
Third, we consider using hedge fund illiquidity indices based only on funds that are in style
categories that are close to the asset class under consideration.10 For international equities
we consider two hedge fund styles, Directional Tradersand Security Selection.For corporate
bonds the natural style to consider is Fixed Income,and for currencies we use Global Macro.
For international equities we nd that the two style-specic illiquidity indices generate the same
10Details on the mapping from individual fund styles, as reported to a given hedge fund database, to the ten style
categories that we consider in this paper, are provided in Patton, Ramadorai, and Streateld (2013).
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number of signicant coe¢ cients, but slightly lower average R2: For corporate bonds the Fixed
Income hedge fund illiquidity index generates slightly stronger results than that based on all funds,
while for currencies the Global Macro index performs slightly worse. In the supplemental appendix
we present a theoretical analysis of the choice between asset-specic indices and a broader all
index, highlighting the trade-o¤s between averaging across more funds and gaining robustness to
style-misclassication, against greater precision of the illiquidity information.
Finally, we consider two further variations of our index. The rst is based on estimated au-
tocorrelations that are untrimmed, in contrast to our baseline analysis which imposes that the
autocorrelations are weakly positive. The second uses AUM weighting rather than equal weighting
to construct the index. We see that the index based on untrimmed autocorrelation performs ap-
proximately as well as our baseline index, and in fact, slightly better for international equities and
currencies. Constructing the index using AUM weights slightly worsens performance relative to the
baseline case, consistent with Figure 1, which showed that the AUM-weighted index had smaller
uctuations than the equal-weighted index. As noted above, this is not too surprising, as larger
funds may be less senstive to funding liquidity pressures imposed by prime-brokerage relationships
and capital inows.
6. Conclusion
Detecting evidence of hedge fundsimpact on asset markets is an important endeavour given their
size, leverage, and signicant role in the provision of liquidity. We create a simple measure of aggre-
gate hedge fund illiquidity by averaging fund-specic return autocorrelations across a large universe
of hedge funds. We nd that the resulting measure is a highly signicant and robust predictor of
returns, both in-sample and out-of-sample, for international equity indexes, US corporate bonds,
and currencies.
We build a simple model of liquidity provision by hedge funds who are endowed with illiquid
asset holdings, and face a shortfall penalty for not holding su¢ cient cash to cover the threat of
withdrawals by their outside investors. The model is able to explain our main empirical ndings,
and yields additional testable implications which are supported in the data.
We view these results as a useful addition to the literatures on hedge funds and the e¤ects of
asset-market liquidity on returns. In future work, we hope to explore the implications of this and
other measures of the impact of hedge funds on asset markets to explain a broader range of asset
market outcomes.
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Appendix: An extension of Clark and West (2006)
Clark and West (2006) consider the problem of testing equal predictive accuracy of a linear
regression and a model with no parameters. In this appendix we propose a simple generalization
that allows the smallermodel to include a constant. Denote the two forecasts as:
Y^
(1)
t+1jt = ^t (6.1)
Y^
(2)
t+1jt = X
0
t+1^t
The second forecast is based on a set of predictor variables Xt+1; which includes a constant, and so
nests the smaller model. Both forecasts are based on parameters estimated using a rolling window
of data (and so they are not constant through the sample) of xed length R: The sample period
runs from t = 1; 2; :::; R;R + 1; :::; R + P + 1  T: The mean squared prediction errors (MSPEs)
over the out of sample period (t = R+ 1; :::; R+ P ) are:
^21 =
1
P
R+PX
t=R+1
(yt+1   ^t)2 (6.2)
^22 =
1
P
R+PX
t=R+1

yt+1  X 0t+1^t
2
The null and alternative hypotheses are
H0 : 
2
1 = 
2
2 vs. H1 : 
2
1 > 
2
2 (6.3)
That is, the small and large models are equally good under the null, while under the alternative
the small model is worse than the large model. Note that under the null, where the smaller model
is correct, we have
yt+1 = 
 + "t+1, Et ["t+1] = 0 (6.4)
The di¤erence in the MSPEs of these two forecasts is:
^21   ^22 =
1
P
R+PX
t=R+1

(yt+1   ^t)2  

yt+1  X 0t+1^t
2
(6.5)
=
1
P
R+PX
t=R+1
^2t   2
1
P
R+PX
t=R+1
yt+1^t  
1
P
R+PX
t=R+1

X 0t+1^t
2
+ 2
1
P
R+PX
t=R+1
yt+1X
0
t+1^t
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and so
^21   ^22
p ! E ^2t   E X 0t+1^t2  2E h^t  X 0t+1^ti under H0 as P !1 (6.6)
using the fact that E
h
"t+1X
0
t+1^t
i
= E ["t+1^t] = 0:
When ^t = 0 8t and  = 0 we are in the Clark-West framework, and they note that:
^21   ^22
p !  E

X 0t+1^t
2
under H0 as P !1 (6.7)
That is, when the smaller model is correct, the di¤erence in MSPEs will be centered on a negative
value, even though the two models are both correct (the larger model nests the smaller model, so it
is also correct). The makes the test conservative (since we use a standard Normal as the asymptotic
distribution of the test statistic, which is centered on zero) and so it will be hard to reject in favor
of the larger model when it is correct. Clark and West suggest adjusting ^22 so that the di¤erence
between the MSPEs is centered on zero under the null:
^22;adj = ^
2
2  
1
P
R+PX
t=R+1

X 0t+1^t
2
(6.8)
They show that this provides better properties under the null and under the alternative.
We extend this adjustment to allow the smaller model to include a constant. Intuitively, allowing
for a constant adds a small amount of variability to Forecast 1, making the extra penalty faced by
Forecast 2 slightly lower in relative terms. It also introduces some cross-product terms that need
to be handled. Let us dene an adjusted di¤erence in MSPEs to correct for these terms:
^adj = ^
2
1   ^22  
1
P
R+PX
t=R+1
^2t +
1
P
R+PX
t=R+1

X 0t+1^t
2
+ 2^
1
P
R+PX
t=R+1

^t  X 0t+1^t

where ^ =
1
P
R+PX
t=R+1
yt+1
Next we need to get a limiting distribution for ^adj : In the Clark-West case ^adj is just a linear
combination of sample averages, and so this can be obtained by dening an adjusted di¤erence in
per-period loss variable(f^t+1 in their equation 3.3), and conducting a t-test that that variable is
zero mean. In our case, the cross-product term introduces a product of sample averages, and so we
cannot use that approach. Instead, we use the delta method to get the limiting distribution of our
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test statistic. Let
gt
(61)
= [(yt+1   ^t)2 ; 

yt+1  X 0t+1^t
2
; ^2t ;

X 0t+1^t
2
; 2

^t  X 0t+1^t

; yt+1]
0 (6.9)
Under standard regularity conditions we obtain:
p
P (gP   g0) d ! N (0; Vg) as P !1 (6.10)
As in Clark and West (2006), the asymptotic covariance matrix, Vg; should be estimated using a
HAC estimator (e.g., Newey-West). Our test statistic is a nonlinear function of gP
^adj = f (gP ) = g1 + g2 + g3 + g4 + g5g6 (6.11)
and so by the delta method we obtain:
p
P (f (gP )  f (g0)) =
p
P

^adj  0

d ! N  0;rgf (gP )Vgrgf (gP )0 (6.12)
where rgf (gP ) = @f (gP ) =@g0 = [1; 1; 1; 1; g6; g5]
We can use this to obtain a Clark-West style test for the larger model versus a model just including
a constant. Specically, we compute the test statistic
p
P ^adj=
q
@f (gP ) V^g@f (gP )
0 and compare
it to the right-tail critical values of the N (0; 1) distribution (1.28, 1.65, 2.33) to get a test at the
10%, 5% or 1% level.
The supplemental appendix presents a small simulation study verifying that this test has sat-
isfactory nite-sample properties, and conrming that it also leads to power gains relative to the
unadjusted test.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Asset Returns
Reported are the average, the standard deviation, the mean, the maximum,
and the minimum, for monthly log excess returns in % of international
equities and US corporate bonds. For currencies, the statistics are based
on monthly returns with USD as the base currency. For international
equities and currencies, the time series starts in January 1995 and ends in
December 2011. For US corporate bonds, the time series starts in January
1997 and ends in December 2011.
Panel A: International Equities
Average Std Dev Max Min
Australia 0.625 6.403 15.989 -32.581
Austria 0.339 7.058 17.756 -42.588
Belgium 0.356 6.020 15.331 -36.274
Canada 0.721 6.178 19.901 -31.179
Denmark 0.587 5.950 16.635 -28.925
Finland 0.575 9.239 26.508 -34.564
France 0.392 6.211 13.916 -24.795
Germany 0.316 6.679 19.782 -26.658
Hong Kong 0.401 7.560 27.622 -34.038
Ireland 0.325 6.356 16.202 -26.787
Italy 0.195 7.091 18.914 -27.153
Japan -0.282 5.462 15.200 -14.452
Netherlands 0.365 6.551 15.452 -34.552
New Zealand 0.186 6.390 14.453 -21.282
Norway 0.592 7.891 17.681 -36.923
Singapore 0.209 7.792 25.642 -33.974
Spain 0.519 6.661 18.231 -26.032
Sweden 0.680 7.686 22.440 -32.318
Switzerland 0.495 5.044 12.130 -16.435
UK 0.379 4.766 13.208 -22.279
US 0.448 4.622 10.356 -18.347
Panel B: US Corporate Bonds
Rating
Inv Grade (24 Portfolios) 0.346 1.703 15.146 -16.070
High Yield (18 Portfolios) 0.375 3.811 31.302 -36.268
Maturity
1-3Y (7 Portfolios) 0.325 1.827 31.302 -22.596
3-5Y (7 Portfolios) 0.325 1.931 14.882 -24.184
5-7Y (7 Portfolios) 0.344 2.280 20.874 -25.359
7-10Y (7 Portfolios) 0.279 2.774 17.899 -30.674
10-15Y (7 Portfolios) 0.347 3.230 23.176 -36.268
15+Y (7 Portfolios) 0.532 3.596 24.717 -28.694
Panel C: Currencies
Monthly Log Returns from Jan 1995 to Dec 2011
Australia 0.135 3.653 9.899 -17.108
Canada 0.155 2.455 8.936 -13.009
Euro 0.019 3.017 9.609 -10.196
Japan 0.127 3.259 16.273 -9.698
New Zealand 0.096 3.640 12.507 -13.931
Norway 0.061 3.201 7.785 -13.739
Sweden 0.037 3.318 9.127 -11.621
Switzerland 0.163 3.244 12.368 -11.945
UK -0.003 2.441 9.044 -10.215
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Table 4: Out-of-Sample Forecast Performance
Reported are the results of rolling 5 year OOS forecasts with single predictor regressions. The
dependent variable is the mothly log excess return for international equities and US corporate
bonds and the monthly log return for currencies. For international equities and currencies,
we report the OOS R2 and whether we can reject the historical average model based on an
extension of the Clark-West test-statistic, which is denoted by * for 10% significance and **
for 5% significance. For US corporate bonds, the number of portfolios for which we can reject
the historical average model at the 10% level is in parentheses. The last row in every panel
shows the average OOS R2 and the total number of portfolios for which the historical average
model is rejected. For international equities and currencies, the time series starts in January
1995 and ends in December 2011. The time series for US corporate bonds starts in January
1997 and ends in December 2011.
Panel A: International Equities
Country
Hedge Fund
Illiq.
Measure
Dividend
Yield
Lagged
Returns
VIX AR(2)
Shocks
Australia 9.039** -2.168 -1.388 -6.712
Austria 4.366** -1.066 2.162 -0.131*
Belgium 3.260** -2.415 6.447* 0.329*
Canada 2.711** -4.166 -3.172 -1.204
Denmark 2.680** 0.391 -0.034 -2.352*
Finland 1.815** -4.947 1.582** -2.896
France 2.296** -7.889 -1.495 -4.336
Germany 0.720* -16.759* -2.940 -3.689
Hong Kong 3.328** -4.762 -0.863 -7.337
Ireland 2.739* -10.029 6.523* 0.027
Italy 2.311** -3.202 -0.987 -3.102
Japan -0.887* -2.379 0.673* -0.071**
Netherlands 3.679* -8.290 -1.869 -4.678
New Zealand 5.764** -49.206 -2.395 -1.017
Norway 4.836** -4.530 -3.130 -0.447
Singapore 3.973** -7.489 -1.552 -5.929
Spain 4.569** -4.617 -1.600 -4.729
Sweden 3.119** -14.052 -0.717 -6.160
Switzerland 0.963 -4.853 -0.107 -0.186
UK 4.653** -6.041 1.200 -2.511
US 1.657* -1.278 -1.527 -4.912
Across 21 Countries 3.219 (20) -7.607 (1) -0.247 (4) -2.954 (4)
Panel B: US Corporate Bonds
Rating/Maturity
Hedge Fund
Illiq.
Measure
Lagged
Returns
VIX AR(2)
Shocks
VWM Ex.
Return
Inv Grade (24 Portfolios) 3.300 (11) -7.017 (0) -8.240 (2) -7.395 (0)
High Yield (18 Portfolios) 5.835 (17) -4.077 (10) 0.234 (3) 3.259 (17)
1-3Y (7 Portfolios) 4.343 (5) -17.107 (1) -3.330 (1) -3.592 (2)
3-5Y (7 Portfolios) 5.053 (4) -2.465 (3) -3.421 (1) -1.662 (3)
5-7Y (7 Portfolios) 4.664 (5) -3.837 (1) -5.026 (2) -2.418 (3)
7-10Y (7 Portfolios) 4.594 (5) -5.423 (1) -7.023 (0) -3.672 (3)
10-15Y (7 Portfolios) 3.059 (4) -0.442 (1) -5.105 (0) -2.807 (3)
15+Y (7 Portfolios) 4.604 (5) -5.267 (3) -3.742 (1) -2.824 (3)
Across 42 Portfolios 4.386 (28) -5.757 (10) -4.608 (5) -2.829 (17)
Panel C: Currencies
Currency
Hedge Fund
Illiq.
Measure
Inflation
Diff.
Interest
Rate Diff.
Lagged
Returns
Australia 4.098** -0.342 -0.631 -2.847
Canada 1.372** 0.744* 0.875 -2.364
Euro -0.405 4.786** -1.682 -2.663
Japan -4.229 -2.231 -6.230 -4.658
New Zealand 3.545** -2.231 2.632* -1.910
Norway 0.790 -2.565 -1.268 -4.893
Sweden -1.365 1.012 1.067** -3.304
Switzerland -2.186 -0.109* -2.174 -2.316
UK -1.895 -2.905 0.196 -1.250
Across 9 Currencies -0.030 (3) -0.427 (3) -0.802 (2) -2.912 (0)
Table 5: Model Simulation
Panel A reports the parameter values used for the model simulations in Panel B and C.
Panel B reports the statistics for model simulations based on fixed values of C0. For each
value of C0, the model is simulated 10, 000 times. The parameters d2 and u1 are drawn
randomly from normal distributions with mean 1 and 0 (variance 0.01 and 0.5), respectively,
for each of the 10, 000 simulations. The ρ, returns, and prices, are averaged across the
10, 000 simulations. Panel C reports the estimates of α and γ for the predictive regression
rt+1 = α+ γρt + t+1 estimated with 10, 000 data points of simulated data from our model.
The parameters d2, u1, and C0 are drawn randomly for each of the 10, 000 simulations. The
parameters d2 and u1 are drawn from the same distributions as in Panel B. C0 is drawn
from a normal distribution with mean of 4 and variance of 0.50.
Panel A: Parameter Values for Model
E[d2] σ
2
d λ α θ φmax E[u1] σ
2
u
1 0.01 0.01 3 10 0.5 0 0.5
Panel B: Model Simulation for Fixed C0
No Liquidity Constraint
Expected Noise Traders Noise Traders
C0 C0/θ φmax(θ + C0) ρ
model Return Buy Price Sell Price
NA NA NA NA 0.005% 1.012 0.988
With Liquidity Constraint
Expected Price Discount
C0 C0/θ φmax(θ + C0) ρ
model Return NT Buy NT Sell
5.0 0.5 7.5 0.666 2.517% 2.075% -2.834%
4.0 0.4 7.0 0.714 3.017% 2.569% -3.239%
3.0 0.3 6.5 0.768 3.517% 2.964% -3.745%
Panel C: Predictive Regression on Simulated Data
Estimates
All Observations Noise Traders Buy Noise Traders Sell
β0 -0.241 -0.157 -0.199
β1 15.400 5.539 6.930
Table 6: Panel Estimation Conditioning on Sign of Lagged Return
Reported are the results of a fixed effects panel estimation with jackknife
standard errors clustered by time. The dependent variables are monthly
log excess returns or monthly log returns in the case of currencies. The
independent variables are lagged by one month and divided by their respective
standard deviations, such that the parameter estimates are comparable. For
international equities and currencies, the time series start in January 1995
and end in December 2011. The time series for US corporate bond starts in
January 1997 and end in December 2011. Estimates significant at the 10%
level are denoted by *, and estimates significant at the 5% level are denoted
by **.
Panel A: International Equities (1) (2) (3)
Lagged Returns 0.912* 0.844 0.842
(1.718) (1.598) (1.572)
HF Illiq. Measure*Negative Lag Ret. Dummy 1.857** 1.857**
(2.818) (2.809)
HF Illiq. Measure*Positive Lag Ret. Dummy 0.793* 0.793*
(1.846) (1.846)
Adj R2 (%) 4.852 2.714 5.687
Panel B: US Corporate Bonds
Lagged Returns 0.495** 0.406* 0.415*
(2.411) (1.888) (1.923)
HF Illiq. Measure*Negative Lag Ret. Dummy 0.454* 0.450*
(1.954) (1.918)
HF Illiq. Measure*Positive Lag Ret. Dummy 0.544** 0.542**
(3.849) (3.844)
Adj R2 (%) 3.879 5.282 6.174
Panel C: Currencies
Lagged Returns 0.095 0.064 0.074
(0.526) (0.362) (0.407)
HF Illiq. Measure*Negative Lag Ret. Dummy 0.765** 0.764**
(2.724) (2.720)
HF Illiq. Measure*Positive Lag Ret. Dummy 0.239 0.237
(1.160) (1.154)
Adj R2 (%) 2.376 0.348 2.649
Table 7: Panel Estimation with Illiquidity Dummy Variables
Reported are the coefficient estimates and t-stats, which are computed with jackknife stan-
dard errors clustered by time, of a fixed effects panel estimation. The dependent variables
are monthly log excess returns. The independent variables are lagged by one month and
divided by their respective standard deviations. For international equities, the illiquidity
dummy is equal to one for all the countries with a market cap below the median market cap
of the 21 countries over the sample period. For US corporate bonds, the High Yield Dummy
is equal to 1, when the portfolio is rated as high yield. The Maturity >5Y Dummy is equal
to 1, when the portfolio contains corporate bonds with a maturity greater than 5 years. For
currencies, the illiquidity dummy is equal to one for all the currencies with an average 1M
Libor rate over the sample period above the median across the 9 currencies. For currencies
and international equities, the time series starts in January 1995 and ends in December
2011. The time series for corporate bonds starts in January 1997. Estimates significant
at the 10% level are denoted by *, and estimates significant at the 5% level are denoted by **.
Panel A: International Equities
VIX AR(2) -1.046*
(-1.669)
Dividend Yield -0.034
(-0.126)
Lagged Returns 0.057
(0.150)
HF Illiquidity Measure 1.166**
(3.066)
HF Illiquidity Measure*(Illiquidity Dummy) 0.272**
(2.128)
Adj R2 (in %) 6.433
Panel B: US Corporate Bonds (1) (2)
Pastor Stambaugh Traded Liq. Factor -0.282** -0.282**
(-2.044) (-2.042)
VWM Excess Return -0.144 -0.144
(-0.569) (-0.569)
VIX AR(2) Shocks -0.549 -0.549
(-1.553) (-1.551)
Lagged Returns 0.341** 0.338**
(2.158) (2.110)
Hedge Fund Illiquidity Measure 0.229*
(1.955)
Hedge Fund Illiquidity Measure*(High Yield Dummy) 0.666**
(2.626)
Hedge Fund Illiquidity Measure 0.375**
(3.137)
Hedge Fund Illiquidity Measure*(Maturity >5Y Dummy) 0.197**
(2.713)
Adj R2 (in %) 10.335 9.090
Panel C: Currencies
Inflation Differential 0.437**
(3.228)
Interest Rate Differential 0.031
(0.187)
Hedge Fund Illiquidity Measure 0.206
(1.134)
Hedge Fund Illiquidity Measure*(High Int. Rate Dummy) 0.264**
(2.463)
Adj R2 (in %) 3.860
Table 8: Robustness Checks
This table presents robustness checks of our main results, and the first row of this
table corresponds to the bottom-right elements of Panels A, B and C of Table 3. We
present the average adjusted R2 of multiple predictor regressions across all assets
within an asset class, the number of assets for which the coefficient of the hedge fund
illiquidity measure is significant (at the 10% level) and positive and significant and
negative. All predictors are lagged by one month. The dependent variables are the
mothly log excess return for US corporate bonds and international equities, and the
monthly log return for currencies. The time series for US corporate bonds starts in
January 1997 and ends in December 2011. For currencies and international equities,
the time series starts in January 1995 and ends in December M2011. The time series
for all hedge fund illiquidity measures start before January 1995, except AR(1) 18M,
which starts in June 1995, and AR(1) 24M, which starts in December 1995. The
style specific hedge fund illiquidity factors are computed with Fixed Income funds
for US corporate bonds, Global Macro funds for currencies, and Directional Traders
and Security Selection funds for international equities.
Int. Equities US Corp. Bonds Currencies
Base Case 7.133 (21/0) 12.186 (32/0) 4.110 (5/0)
Varying Window Length
9M 4.686 (12/0) 12.494 (33/0) 3.202 (1/0)
18M 5.276 (14/0) 10.921 (28/0) 3.606 (2/0)
24M 4.281 (8/0) 10.597 (32/0) 3.212 (0/0)
Varying Autocorrelation
All AR2V2 Average Trimmed 4.842 (17/0) 10.729 (32/0) 3.194 (1/0)
All MA1 Average Trimmed 7.922 (21/0) 12.418 (30/0) 4.714 (5/0)
All MA2V2 Average Trimmed 5.501 (20/0) 10.966 (31/0) 3.335 (1/0)
Different Styles
Directional Traders 6.401 (21/0)
Security Selection 6.420 (21/0)
Fixed Income 12.280 (34/0)
Global Macro 3.196 (2/0)
Other Variations
AUM Weighted 5.577 (17/0) 10.123 (17/0) 4.033 (4/0)
Untrimmed 7.647 (21/0) 12.036 (32/0) 4.513 (5/0)
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Figure 2 A: This figure shows the average adjusted R2 and number of significant coefficients of
the hedge fund illiquidity measure for different forecast horizons (in months). The results are
for single predictor in-sample regressions, i.e. the only predictor is the hedge fund illiquidity
measure.
Figure 2 B: This figure shows the average adjusted R2 and number of significant coefficients of
the hedge fund illiquidity measure for different forecast horizons (in months). The results are
for multiple predictor in-sample regressions, i.e. the hedge fund illiquidity measure is included
together with competitor variables.
Figure 3: The return reversal for low and high ρ is shown. The values in this figure are not directly
related to our model or the empirical analysis.
Figure 4: The return reversal for a liquid and an illiquid asset is shown. ρ is assumed to be high in both
cases. The values in this figure are not directly related to our model or the empirical analysis.
Internet Appendix for
The Impact of Hedge Funds on Asset Markets
This internet appendix provides supplemental analyses to "The Impact of Hedge Funds on Asset
Markets".
The rst section describes a Monte Carlo simulation to study the nite-sample size of our ex-
tension of Clark and West (2006). The second section presents a stylized model to study how
hedge fund style "drift" or style misreporting can a¤ect the informativeness of an illiquidity index
based on funds from a single style category relative to an aggregate index based on all hedge funds.
In the last section, we present a table with detailed results for predictive in-sample regressions for
US corporate bonds. The tables and gures are as follows:
Table IA.I: Clark-West Extension Rejection Probabilities When Null Hypothesis Is True
Table IA.II: Clark-West Extension Rejection Probabilities When Null Hypothesis Is False
Figure IA.I: Clark-West Extension Test Statistic Distribution
Table IA.III: In-Sample Predictive Performance of US Corporate Bonds
Figure IA.II: Hedge Fund Style Indices vs. an Aggregate Index
A Monte Carlo Simulation Study
To study the nite-sample size of this extension of Clark and West (2006) we conduct a small
simulation study. The target variable and forecasts are generated as follows:
Yt = 
 +  Xt + "t, (IA.1.)
where Xt  1
k
kX
i=1
Xit
X 0t; "t
0 s iid N (0; Ik+1)
Y^
(1)
t+1jt = ^t
Y^
(2)
t+1jt =

1; X 0t+1

^t
To study the nite-sample size properties of the test, we set  = 0; and so the DGP includes
just a consant, . In this case both models are correct, but Forecast 1 will do better in nite
samples because it does not include any irrelevant variables. To study power we let  = 0:1; which
means that each of the included regressors in Forecast 2 is useful, and Forecast 1 is misspecied.
We consider in-sample estimation period lengths of R 2 f100; 200; 500; 1000; 5000g ; and an out-
of-sample evaluation period of P = 1000: The number of extra regressors in the larger model is set
to k 2 f1; 5; 10g : We repeat the simulation 1000 times.
In Table IA.I we present the nite-sample rejection probabilities when the null hypothesis is
true, using 0.05 level tests. We report our proposed adjusted test, as well as the usual unad-
justed test, which corresponds to the Diebold and Mariano (1995) test. Table IA.I shows that
the unadjusted test is very conservative (with rejection probabilities much lower than 0.05), par-
ticularly for small R. The adjustedtest provides better size control, with rejection probabilities
closer to the nominal 0.05 level. The improvement from the adjustment is particularly great when
k is large and R is small, consistent with theory.
Table IA.II reports rejection probabilities when the null is false, which provides insights into
the power of the adjusted and unadjusted tests. Consistent with the results under the null, the
unadjusted test has low power to reject the null when it is false, and we see that the adjusted
test has much better power than the unadjusted test. Figure IA.I illustrates where the gains come
from: the adjusted test re-centers the distribution of test statistics on zero, which makes the test
less conservative under the null, and more powerful under the alternative.
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Table IA.I:
Rejection probabilities when null hypothesis is true
This table presents the rejection probabilities from the unadjustedand adjustedtests of
equal predictive accuracy, at the 0.05 level. R represents the length of the in-sample estimation
period; k represents the number of regressors in the larger model (excluding the constant).
R=100 R=200 R=500 R=1000 R=5000
k=1
Unadjusted 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.013
Adjusted 0.030 0.027 0.031 0.019 0.031
k=5
Unadjusted 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013
Adjusted 0.049 0.035 0.042 0.050 0.049
k=10
Unadjusted 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009
Adjusted 0.057 0.042 0.047 0.046 0.043
2
Table IA.II:
Rejection probabilities when null hypothesis is false
This table presents the rejection probabilities from the unadjustedand adjustedtests of
equal predictive accuracy, at the 0.05 level. R represents the length of the in-sample estimation
period; k represents the number of regressors in the larger model (excluding the constant).
R=100 R=200 R=500 R=1000 R=5000
k=1
Unadjusted 0.014 0.079 0.249 0.382 0.450
Adjusted 0.631 0.741 0.846 0.906 0.923
k=5
Unadjusted 0.014 0.364 0.869 0.949 0.962
Adjusted 0.997 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
k=10
Unadjusted 0.004 0.599 0.996 0.998 1.000
Adjusted 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
3
Figure IA.I: Distribution of the test statistics from the "unadjusted" and "adjusted" tests across
1000 simlations. The in-sample period length is 200 and the out-of-sample length is 1000 observa-
tions. The larger model includes a single extra regressor (left panel) or 10 extra regressors (right
panel).
4
Hedge Fund Style Indices vs. an Aggregate Index
This appendix presents a stylized model to study how hedge fund style drift or style mis-
reporting can a¤ect the informativeness of an illiquidity index based on funds from a single style
category relative to an aggregate index based on all hedge funds.
Consider the following simple framework. There are N individual hedge funds (with N large;
in our empirical application it is 29,496). There are S = 10 di¤erent styles (to match our empirical
application), and we will assume that there are K = N=S funds in each style.
Assume that for each hedge fund style there is an asset index that is close to that style, so
there are also S asset indices. (e.g., Fixed income hedge funds and corporate bond returns, security
selection hedge funds and equity returns, etc.) Returns on each asset class index are linked to
liquidity, and have a component that is not related to liquidity:
rs;t+1 = 

s + 

sL

s;t + u

s;t+1, s = 1; 2; :::; S (IA.2.)
We will assume that all parameters are the same across styles, all shocks are mean zero, Normal,
homoskedastic, and independent from each other.
Hedge fund returns for funds in a given style provide us with a noisy estimate of the liquidity
of that asset class:
~Li;t = L

s(i);t + i;t, for i = 1; 2; ::; N (IA.3.)
where s (i) 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg
s (i) is the style of hedge fund i: (In our application our noisy estimate of hedge fund liquidity is
based on autocorrelations; we abstract from that particular measure here and simply consider a
generic noisy measure of liquidity.) We average the liquidity estimates from each fund in style s to
obtain an aggregate liquidity index for that style:
Ls;t =
1
K
NX
i=1
~Li;t1 fs (i) = sg (IA.4.)
and across all funds to get an aggregate liquidity index:
Lt =
1
N
NX
i=1
~Li;t (IA.5.)
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We use the (noisy) liquidity indices extraced from hedge fund returns in a regression to try to
predict future asset index returns:
rs;t+1 = ~s + ~s Ls;t + ~us;t+1, s = 1; 2; :::; S (IA.6.)
Clearly, the closer Ls;t is to Ls;t; the better this prediction will be.
Case 1: Styles are correctly reported
In this baseline case
Ls;t =
1
K
NX
i=1
 
Ls;t + i;t

1 fs (i) = sg (IA.7.)
= Ls;t +
1
K
NX
i=1
i;t1 fs (i) = sg
 Ls;t + s;t, s;t s N

0;
1
K
2

The estimated coe¢ cient on Ls;t is:
~s =
Cov

Ls;t; rs;t+1

V

Ls;t
 = Cov Ls;t + s;t; rs;t+1
V

Ls;t + s;t
 = s 11 + 2=  K2L (IA.8.)
where 2L = V

Ls;t

: This is the familiar shrinkage of a regression parameter towards zero when
the dependent variable is measured with error. The R2 of this model is
~R2 = Corr

Ls;t; rs;t+1
2
=
Cov

Ls;t; rs;t+1
2 
2L +
1
K
2


2r
= R2
1
1 + 2=
 
K2L
2
r
 (IA.9.)
where R2 is the R2 from the regression if we could directly observe Ls;t; and 2r = V [rs;t+1] : Next,
we compare the above base case with what is obtained in the presence of style mis-labelling, style
drift, etc.
Case 2: Style mis-labelling
Perhaps because of style drift, or style mis-reporting, or just errors in classifying the hedge fund
style, it may be that a fund that is listed as being in style s is actually in style j: Let p be the
probability that the reported style label, denoted ~s (i) ; is correct, i.e.,
p = Pr [~s (i) = s (i)] (IA.10.)
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and assume this is the same across funds. For simplicity, assume that when the label is incorrect,
the label is randomly chosen from the remaining S   1 styles.
To obtain the main results for this case, we will use the fact that
1
N
NX
i=1
1 f~s (i) = s; s (i) = sg  E [1 f~s (i) = s; s (i) = sg] for N large (IA.11.)
= Pr [~s (i) = s; s (i) = s]
= Pr [~s (i) = sjs (i) = s] Pr [s (i) = s]
= p
1
S
and
1
N
NX
i=1
1 f~s (i) = s; s (i) = j 6= sg  E [1 f~s (i) = s; s (i) = j 6= sg] (IA.12.)
= Pr [~s (i) = s; s (i) = j 6= s]
= Pr [~s (i) = sjs (i) = j 6= s] Pr [s (i) = j 6= s]
=
1  p
S   1
1
S
So we can obtain:
Ls;t =
1
K
NX
i=1

Ls(i);t + i;t

1 f~s (i) = sg (IA.13.)
=
SX
j=1
Lj;t
1
K
NX
i=1
1 f~s (i) = s; s (i) = jg+ 1
K
NX
i=1
i;t1 f~s (i) = sg| {z }
s;tsN(0;2=K)
= Ls;t
1
K
NX
i=1
1 f~s (i) = s; s (i) = sg+
SX
j=1;j 6=s
Lj;t
1
K
NX
i=1
1 f~s (i) = s; s (i) = jg+ s;t
= Ls;t
N
K
p
S
+
SX
j=1;j 6=s
Lj;t
N
K
1  p
S   1
1
S
+ s;t
= pLs;t +
1  p
S   1
SX
j=1;j 6=s
Lj;t + s;t
using the fact that N=K = S. This last line expresses Ls;t as a weighted average of each of the
individual style indices. We can re-write it to be a weighted average of just the target style index
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and the Allindex:
Ls;t = pL

s;t +
1  p
S   1
SX
j=1;j 6=s
Lj;t + s;t (IA.14.)
= pLs;t +
1  p
S   1
SX
j=1
Lj;t + s;t  
1  p
S   1L

s;t
=
pS   1
S   1 L

s;t +
1  p
S   1
SX
j=1
Lj;t + s;t
=
pS   1
S   1 L

s;t +
S (1  p)
S   1
Lt + s;t
Note that the noise term, s;t; does not depend on p; but it does depend on K through its variance.
When p = 1 the style label is always correct and we obtain:
Ls;t = L

s;t + s;t (IA.15.)
as in the base case. When p = 1=S the style label is correct as often as a random guess and we
obtain
Ls;t =
1
SS   1
S   1 L

s;t +
S
 
1  1S

S   1
Lt + s;t = L

t + s;t (IA.16.)
That is, when the labels are randomly applied, the index average is equal to the aggregate index
average plus some measurement error.
The above calculations reveal the bias-variancetrade-o¤ between using a style-specic index
and using an aggregate index: When we average across all funds we get an index centered on
the average liquidity, Lt ; which is not really what we want (a form of bias), but it has small
measurement error (lower variance): t s N
 
0; 2=N

: When we average across just those funds
in the style we care about we get an index that is more heavily weighted on the style we care about
(for values of p > 1=S), but it has greater measurement error: s;t s N
 
0; 2=K

:
To nd the thresholdvalue for p that makes these two approaches equally accurate, we need to
take a stand on the correlation between liquidity factors in di¤erent styles. To generate correlation
between liquidity in di¤erent asset classes, we assume a simple factor structure. Let:
Ls;t = L

c;t + s;t, s = 1; 2; :::; L (IA.17.)
Without loss of generality, let V

Lc;t

= 1; and then note that 2 = 
2
L   2: Note that the R2 of
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this regression is:
2c  Corr

Ls;t; L

c;t
2
=
2
2 + 2v
=
2
2L
(IA.18.)
Then we obtain:
Cov

Ls;t; L

j;t

= 2 (IA.19.)
and Cov

rs;t+1; L

s;t

= 2L
Cov

rs;t+1; L

j;tjj 6= s

= Cov

rs;t+1; L

c;t + j;t

= Cov

rs;t+1; 


1
2L
Ls;t + zt

+ j;t

= 2
1
2L
Cov

rs;t+1; L

s;t

= 2c
2L
So if the common component is very strong (c is near 1) then using the wrongstyle liquidity
does not matter; it is almost as good as the right style. When the common component is weak, the
covariance is pulled towards zero.
Now consider the R2 from the predictive regression using the aggregate index. First we obtain
the covariance between the aggregate index and a given asset style return:
Cov

Lt; rs;t+1

=
1
S
Cov

Ls;t; rs;t+1

+
1
S
SX
j=1;j 6=s
Cov

Lj;t; rs;t+1

=
1 + (S   1) 2c
S
2L (IA.20.)
and the variance of the aggregate index:
V

Lt

=
1
S2
V
24 SX
j=1
Lj;t
35+ V [t] = 1
S2
V

SLc;t

+
1
S2
SX
j=1
V [j;t] +
1
N
2 (IA.21.)
=
(S   1)K2 +K2L + 2
N
=
(S   1)
S
2 +
1
S
2L +
1
N
2
Combing the above we nd that the R2 is
R2all =
 
1 + (S   1) 2c
2
K24L
(S   1)N2c2L +N2L + S2
1
2r
(IA.22.)
=
 
1 + (S   1) 2c
2 K
S
1 
(S   1)K2c +K + 2
R2;
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where 2  2
2L
and R2  Corr Ls;t; rs;t+12 = 22L2r .
We can contrast this R2 with that obtained from the individual style liquidity index:
R2s =
p2 (S   1)K
(p2S   2p+ 1)K + (S   1)2R
2
s (IA.23.)
Using these two expressions, we can solve for the value p that equates them. The solution is
lengthy and we illustrate it below. The comparative statics reveal that the required proportion of
correct individual style labels (p) is higher when:
1. Holding the number of individual funds (N) xed, the number of hedge funds in each style
(K) is lower or the number of styles (S) is higher: fewer funds per style means the individual
style index is noisier.
2. The noise to signal ratio of each individual liquidity estimate (  =L) is higher.
3. The correlation between the individual style liquidity measures and the common liquidity
measure (c) is higher: when this is higher the aggregate index does better, and so the style
labels must be accurate with higher probability to counteract this.
In our data, the average correlation between our style indices is L = 0:5869, suggesting that
c = 0:7661: This approximately corresponds to the thick solid line in Figure IA.II below.
In summary, Figure AI.II reveals that depending on the parameters that describe the model,
it is possible that the individual style illiquidity index is always preferred, is never preferred, or
is sometimes preferred to the aggregate index. Thus, which illiquidity index to use in practice is
something that needs to be determined empirically.
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Figure IA.II: Proportion of hedge funds with the correct style label needed to make the style
liquidity index as good as the aggregate liquidity index. The x-axis shows the noise-to-signal ratio
of individual liquidity measures, and the four lines consider di¤ering degrees of correlation between
liquidity across styles.
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Tabel AI.III: In-Sample Predictive Performance of US Corporate Bonds
Reported are the signs of the predictors (in the case of multiple predictors, it stands for the sign
of the hedge fund illiquidity measure), the adjusted R2 of the in-sample predictive regression in
%, and the signicance of the hedge fund illiquidity measure (* for 10% and ** for 5%). The
AUM weighted ows are not included in the multiple predictor regression. The time series starts
in January 1997 and ends in December 2011. Newey-West standard errors are used.
Panel A: Single Predictor
Portfolios
Hedge
Fund
Illiq.
Measure
Lagged
Returns
Pastor-
Stamb.
Traded
Liq.
Factor
VIX
AR(2)
Shocks
VWM
Excess
Return
Hedge
Fund
Flows
AAA1-3Y (+) -0.56 (+) 1.15* (-) -0.16 (+) 1.93** (-) 4.88** (-) -0.32
AAA3-5Y (+) -0.44 (+) 0.15 (-) 0.25 (+) 1.89** (-) 4.98** (-) -0.56
AAA5-7Y (+) -0.55 (+) -0.34 (-) -0.28 (+) 1.91** (-) 5.59** (+) -0.49
AAA7-10Y (+) -0.39 (+) -0.23 (-) 0.23 (+) 1.84** (-) 3.99** (+) -0.42
AAA10-15Y (+) -0.47 (-) -0.56 (-) 0.28 (+) 2.13* (-) 4.68** (+) -0.14
AAA15+Y (+) -0.27 (-) -0.4 (-) 1.62* (+) 2.05* (-) 2.88** (+) 0.81
AA1-3Y (+) 1.33 (+) 1.45** (-) 1.28 (+) -0.21 (-) 0.39 (-) 1.00
AA3-5Y (+) 1.55 (+) 0.65* (-) 1.42* (+) 0.011 (-) 1.23 (-) -0.31
AA5-7Y (+) 1.30 (+) -0.09 (-) 0.61 (+) -0.30 (-) 0.83 (-) -0.57
AA7-10Y (+) 1.88* (+) 0.53 (-) 1.45* (+) 0.59 (-) 1.95** (+) -0.56
AA10-15Y (+) -0.05 (+) -0.45 (-) 0.97 (+) -0.11 (-) 1.08* (+) 0.01
AA15+Y (+) 2.01** (+) -0.57 (-) 0.78 (+) -0.13 (-) 0.48 (-) -0.55
A1-3Y (+) 4.96** (+) 7.65** (-) 0.21 (-) -0.20 (+) -0.51 (-) 0.70
A3-5Y (+) 3.77** (+) 2.53** (-) 2.74** (-) -0.46 (-) -0.49 (-) 0.15
A5-7Y (+) 4.93** (+) 2.40* (-) 2.51** (-) -0.56 (-) -0.28 (-) 0.06
A7-10Y (+) 4.03** (+) 2.17* (-) 2.05** (-) -0.51 (-) -0.37 (-) -0.40
A10-15Y (+) 3.08** (+) 0.06 (-) -0.11 (-) -0.51 (-) -0.20 (-) -0.10
A15+Y (+) 4.09** (+) 0.42 (-) 0.34 (-) -0.46 (-) -0.47 (-) -0.38
BBB1-3Y (+) 9.23** (+) 9.07** (-) 0.13 (-) 4.76* (+) 1.76 (-) 3.70*
BBB3-5Y (+) 7.31** (+) 6.27** (-) 0.24 (-) 3.36 (+) 0.40 (-) 1.95
BBB5-7Y (+) 7.73** (+) 5.96** (-) 1.89* (-) 3.02 (+) 0.47 (-) 0.99
BBB7-10Y (+) 7.02** (+) 3.19* (-) 1.69* (-) 2.30 (+) -0.01 (-) 0.84
BBB10-15Y (+) 5.92** (+) 1.43* (-) 1.39 (-) 1.39 (+) -0.47 (-) 0.59
BBB15+Y (+) 6.94** (+) 1.21 (-) 1.63* (-) 0.95 (+) -0.30 (-) 0.12
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Panel A (Continued): Single Predictor
Portfolios
Hedge
Fund
Illiq.
Measure
Lagged
Returns
Pastor-
Stamb.
Traded
Liq.
Factor
VIX
AR(2)
Shocks
VWM
Excess
Return
Hedge
Fund
Flows
BB1-3Y (+) 5.95** (+) 10.16** (-) 1.44* (-) 5.76* (+) 2.41** (-) 2.16*
BB3-5Y (+) 6.68** (-) 8.54** (-) 1.00 (-) 8.05* (+) 3.45** (-) 0.90
BB5-7Y (+) 7.32** (+) 8.51** (-) 0.16 (-) 8.12* (+) 2.94** (+) 1.22
BB7-10Y (+) 7.55** (+) 6.92** (-) 0.05 (-) 5.61 (+) 2.46* (-) 1.56*
BB10-15Y (+) 3.85** (+) 4.26** (-) 1.40* (-) 9.18* (+) 4.54** (-) -0.19
BB15+Y (+) 7.19** (+) 12.33** (-) -0.18 (-) 8.82** (+) 6.63** (-) 0.08
B1-3Y (+) 3.59** (+) -0.35 (-) 0.36 (-) 9.60** (+) 5.28** (-) 1.24
B3-5Y (+) 6.97** (+) 14.58** (-) 0.87 (-) 14.65** (+) 12.55** (-) 0.27
B5-7Y (+) 5.02** (+) 6.39** (-) 0.22 (-) 14.88** (+) 10.14** (-) -0.49
B7-10Y (+) 6.46** (+) 7.05** (-) 1.92** (-) 10.85* (+) 7.34** (-) 0.32*
B10-15Y (+) 8.48** (+) 1.78 (-) 0.16 (-) 7.49** (+) 5.39** (-) 0.61
B15+Y (+) 9.11** (+) 1.48 (-) 0.07 (-) 6.72** (+) 6.30** (-) 1.07
C1-3Y (+) 2.70** (+) 0.34 (-) 2.88** (-) 8.36* (+) 4.48** (-) -0.51
C3-5Y (+) 9.12** (+) 12.41** (-) 0.22 (-) 12.52** (+) 12.14** (-) -0.32
C5-7Y (+) 8.30** (+) 16.76** (-) 0.20 (-) 16.13** (+) 14.80** (+) -0.39
C7-10Y (+) 7.84** (+) 8.23** (-) 1.71** (-) 8.49** (+) 10.89** (-) 0.10
C10-15Y (+) 1.89 (+) 18.35** (-) -0.02 (-) 9.43** (+) 10.50** (-) 1.51
C15+Y (+) 6.55** (+) 6.68** (-) 0.09 (-) 10.73** (+) 8.58** (-) -0.37
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Panel B: Multiple Predictors
Portfolios
Excl. Hedge
Fund Illiq.
Measure
Incl. Hedge
Fund Illiq.
Measure
AAA1-3Y 4.044 (+) 3.497
AAA3-5Y 4.064 (+) 3.669
AAA5-7Y 4.228 (+) 3.731
AAA7-10Y 2.920 (+) 2.547
AAA10-15Y 3.619 (+) 3.196
AAA15+Y 3.115 (+) 2.768
AA1-3Y 2.361 (+) 3.208
AA3-5Y 2.588 (+) 3.735
AA5-7Y 1.002 (+) 2.165
AA7-10Y 3.172 (+) 4.589*
AA10-15Y 0.188 (+) 0.247
AA15+Y 2.625 (+) 4.421**
A1-3Y 8.165 (+) 10.962**
A3-5Y 3.308 (+) 6.039**
A5-7Y 3.134 (+) 6.747**
A7-10Y 3.888 (+) 6.728**
A10-15Y 0.865 (+) 3.659**
A15+Y 3.289 (+) 6.451**
BBB1-3Y 12.774 (+) 19.082**
BBB3-5Y 10.008 (+) 15.303**
BBB5-7Y 9.131 (+) 14.697**
BBB7-10Y 5.902 (+) 11.586**
BBB10-15Y 3.797 (+) 9.143**
BBB15+Y 4.490 (+) 10.089**
BB1-3Y 13.848 (+) 18.012**
BB3-5Y 14.112 (+) 19.392**
BB5-7Y 13.702 (+) 19.444**
BB7-10Y 11.400 (+) 16.890**
BB10-15Y 11.114 (+) 14.356**
BB15+Y 17.372 (+) 21.768**
B1-3Y 11.776 (+) 17.039**
B3-5Y 21.040 (+) 25.867**
B5-7Y 16.850 (+) 21.261**
B7-10Y 15.467 (+) 20.283**
B10-15Y 9.854 (+) 17.248**
B15+Y 8.348 (+) 16.629**
C1-3Y 8.613 (+) 11.311**
C3-5Y 17.016 (+) 24.015**
C5-7Y 24.612 (+) 30.102**
C7-10Y 14.204 (+) 19.865**
C10-15Y 20.996 (+) 22.165**
C15+Y 12.423 (+) 17.992**
14
